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Abstract 
The last decades have witnessed a dramatic growth of internet-based 
communication. This phenomenon and its still partially unexplored potential have 
increasingly attracted the attention of a growing number of political entrepreneurs. 
This paper analyses to what extent it has characterised vertical communication 
between politicians and voters looking at a very particular group: the Members of 
the European Parliament (MEPs). 
To conduct the analysis, this study categorised an impressive number of MEPs’ 
individual websites in the 6
th European Parliament (EP) according to their structural, 
graphic and informative/communicative features. Accordingly, quantitative and 
qualitative cross-country and cross-party variance have been explored taking into 
consideration a wide array of potential explanatory dimensions, including socio-
demographic, country-level, ideological, and electoral factors. The paper also 
presents some preliminary figures concerning the most recent developments in the 
current EP and possible future trajectories. 
This study proposes a categorisation of different MEP types on the basis of their e-
activism: those who are still reluctant to embrace internet-based communication, 
those looking at the web only as a complementary tool alongside more traditional 
forms of communication (e-MEPs) and those who invest a fairly amount of 
resources in these new forms of communication (MEPs 2.0). Our findings show that, 
despite the relevant cross-country and cross-party variance, the last group of MEPs 
2.0 is dramatically growing vis-à-vis the other two. 
When it comes to the analysis of MEPs’ personal web-pages, our study shows that, 
by and large the features of the sites and the communication strategies adopted are 
generally specifically designed to target MEPs’ ‘electorate of reference’ in terms of 
expected demand and proposed offer. 
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* 
1. Introduction 
In recent years, the personalisation of politics has intensified with the rise of new technologies 
(Blondel, 2005; Higley & Pakulski, 2007). In particular, political candidate websites have 
grown both in number and sophistication. The wide variety of options available to candidates 
ranges from simple web pages to extremely flexible and interactive platforms aimed at 
conveying bidirectional flows of communication between the candidate and voters. There are 
two basic objectives driving this trend: 1) improving the candidate’s chances of getting elected, 
and 2) staying in touch with the constituency once elected. 
One example of successful web politics took place in the 2008 US presidential election. Wide 
use of Internet-based networks and interactive participatory tools within the framework of the 
electoral campaign contributed significantly to the Democratic candidate’s success. What were 
at the time non-standard forms of political communication targeted and mobilised effectively 
social groups (such as young people and first-time voters) who usually were disconnected from 
politics and deaf to politicians’ traditional appeals. The platform my.barackobama.com helped 
millions of supporters organise their local communities in order to support and interact with the 
candidate. This new form of politics is likely to change the shape of all campaigns in the 
democratic world. “For Obama the new method was also bang on message. His liberalism is not 
a top-down, managerial variety; it’s more in line with progressive traditions of self-
empowerment. A social network was the perfect medium”.
1 
In Europe the phenomenon of Internet-based political communication appears less sophisticated 
and more primitive in its expression; however, there are indicators of rapid growth at both the 
national and transnational levels. On the eve of the 2009 European elections, the Party of the 
European Socialists (PES) launched the initiative “Your manifesto”: an open online consultation 
to define the party’s electoral manifesto. According to the organisers, more than 3,000 activists 
joined the website (http://elections2009.pes.org) and the consultation involved more than 
300,000 visitors, with hundreds of posts and videos. A draft manifesto was drawn up on the 
basis of the consultation, which provided the foundation for the final PES manifesto
2 adopted by 
the party in December 2008. 
At the EU level, unlike in national contexts, not only is public awareness generally limited – and 
media coverage almost inexistent – but so is scholarly interest, both in the European Parliament 
                                                      
* Stefano Braghiroli is a PhD candidate at the Centre for the Study of Political Change (CIRCaP), 
University of Siena. Contact: Department of History, Law, Political and Social Sciences, Faculty of 
Political Science – University of Siena, Via Mattioli, 10 – 53100 SIENA (Italy). Email: 
braghiroli@unisi.it. 
1 See Andrew Sullivan, “Barack Obama is master of the new Facebook politics”, The Times, 28 May 
2008 (http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/comment/columnists/andrew_sullivan/article3997523.ece, 
accessed on 11 January 2009). 
2 The PES manifesto is available at http://www.pes.org/downloads/PES-Manifest_EN.pdf. 2 | STEFANO BRAGHIROLI 
 
(EP) and outside it. For this reason this paper focuses on the web politics of the Members of the 
European Parliament (MEPs).  
The questions that the present study poses and addresses are: Is the general trend towards 
innovating political strategies also influencing MEP electoral communication? Is it possible to 
identify the defining traits of a European parliamentary dimension to this trend? What future 
developments might we expect? These basic questions still lack credible answers. In our view, 
the EP’s unique nature – especially its plural and multinational character – makes it a perfect 
laboratory for assessing the determinants of MEP communication strategies. 
This study examines the nature of MEP ‘web tools’ in the 6
th EP (2004-2009) and the extent to 
which their features reflect the complex nature of the EP environment (‘Europeanisation of 
communication’). To conduct this study, a variety of structural and graphic features of MEP 
websites have been identified, standardised, categorised, statistically analysed, and, finally, 
collected into a unique data set controlled for a wide array of pluridimensional factors at both 
micro-/individual and macro-/country levels. 
Conceived as an exploratory study towards a clearer and more accurate understanding of MEP 
Internet-based communication styles and political strategies, our analysis aims to discuss 
possible future trajectories of the phenomenon and, in so doing, provide a useful basis for 
further investigation. 
2.  Identifying MEPs 2.0 
There are two basic questions to be addressed. First, how does the phenomenon of Internet-
based political communication vary both quantitatively and qualitatively? And second, what 
factors explain this variance? Our research seems to have potential for innovation in two 
different directions. On the one hand, it represents the first cross-country attempt to include a 
relevant number of MEP websites (with an exclusive focus on the supply-side). On the other 
hand, it addresses new dimensions of vertical political communication. It also embraces a more 
diversified array of explanatory factors (at both micro-/individual and macro-/country levels). 
In the following sections, we will assess the relevance and the nature of MEP Internet-based 
political communication in the 6
th EP, exploring cross-country and cross-party differences.
3 In 
the final section we will briefly discuss the current state of affairs and possible short-term 
developments in the 7
th EP (2009-2014). 
There is a wide range of tools used by the MEPs in addition to personal websites: blogs, social 
networks, simple or complex web pages, etc. The degree of sophistication of the ‘web tool’ and 
the way one MEP decides to interact with his/her constituency or audience might well affect the 
nature of the message conveyed. The nature and intensity of information flows are also key 
aspects. Given the high degree of variance of the web pages analysed, straightforward 
classification criteria are required.
4 
                                                      
3 The present study is based on an original data set developed between January and February 2009. Only 
MEPs’ individual sites have been coded as “personal web pages” and therefore included in the data set. 
Collective web pages of the national delegations or MEPs’ personal sections in the parties’ official 
websites have been systematically excluded. All EU member states (with the exception of Bulgaria and 
Romania) have been included in the analysis. On the whole, a sample of 309 personal web pages have 
been categorised (on the basis of 422 randomly selected MEPs). 
4 The definition of such criteria to evaluate MEP websites represented a key challenge in undertaking the 
project, owing to the necessity of dealing with extremely different national traditions and (at least) 19 
languages. Thus the primary goal has been to define classification criteria which were both informative 
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One of the analytical dimensions of our study focuses specifically on interactivity. Here, we 
considered whether, and to what extent, the flow of information is unidirectional or 
bidirectional. This emerges as an extremely relevant parameter, as it defines the way the ‘web 
tool’ is thought to work: either to disseminate information or to establish some kind of 
participatory dialogue with users (the constituency). Similarly, the variable ‘update’ is an 
indicator of an MEP’s degree of current involvement in the management of their website and 
their current interest in using an Internet-based communication tool. To put it simply, it might 
well be that one website appears highly informative and interactive, but, when looking at the 
updating process, we discover that the last post dates back to one year ago. 
The variable ‘multilingualism’ deserves special attention. Given Parliament’s multinational 
nature and the relevance attributed to multilinguism at the EU level, we expect a specific 
motivation behind one MEP’s choice to develop a website section in a foreign language. 
Sometimes languages have strong symbolic significance; they represent distinct identities and 
cultures. If we consider the case of regional/minority languages such as Euskara in Basque 
Country, Gaelic in Scotland or Hungarian in Slovakia, the decision to include these languages 
has clear political and identity connotations. The decision to translate sections of his/her website 
into one or more foreign languages might also be related to one MEP’s idea of constituency and 
potential audience in a more European perspective. The variable is also supposed to register the 
degree of ‘Europeanisation of communication’. 
A final set of variables has to do with MEP ‘visual identity’. Symbols seem to matter far beyond 
their factual meaning. We detected two basic graphic features potentially identifiable in all MEP 
websites, regardless of their nationality and language: party logos and flags. We distinguished 
between national and European banners. The absence/presence of one, the other or both may 
mirror concrete implications in terms of loyalty, legitimation and identity. 
Four sets of control factors, both at the macro-/country and micro-/individual level, have been 
introduced (see Appendix 1). A first set includes three standard socio-demographic features: 
gender, age and education. A second group of variables focuses on country-level factors 
(postcommunist heritage, country size, and Mediterranean or Scandinavian-Baltic region). A 
third set of factors addresses the effect of partisanship on MEP Internet-based communication 
styles (left/right divide and niche vs. mainstream parties). The last set of control variables deals 
with electoral factors both at the macro- and micro-level (parliamentary tenure, past political 
career, open lists and party centrality
5). 
3. Findings 
Although they share the same institutional environment, MEPs display different attitudes and 
reactions when faced with Internet-based politics (see Table 1). Some MEPs simply ignore it. In 
the 6
th EP the MEPs without a personal web page represented 26.8% of the sample. A plurality 
of them (46.7%) seemed to look at Internet-based political communication as a subsidiary object 
                                                                                                                                                            
‘observational side of the analysis’ than on a content-based assessment of the websites. Priority has been 
given generally to the quantitative features of the web pages rather than to their qualitative side. 
5 When it comes to the assessment of candidates’ liberté de manoeuvre, the analysis focuses on two 
indicators: the size of the electoral districts and (again) the degree of openness of the electoral lists. These 
factors may clearly affect MEPs’ willingness to become involved in Internet-based communication with 
their constituency, in terms of perceived electoral return (cfr. Carlson & Strandberg, 2005). We assume 
that a candidate-based system with an open ballot in local constituencies gives the candidate a high 
degree of independence in the conduct of the campaign, whereas a party-based system consisting of fixed 
lists in one nationwide constituency clearly reduces his/her role vis-à-vis the central party (Bowler & 
Farrel, 1993; Faas, 2003). 4 | STEFANO BRAGHIROLI 
 
vis-à-vis more traditional forms of electoral communication (we shall label them ‘e-MEPs’
6). 
Finally, for a conspicuous minority of MEPs, 26.5%, it seemed to represent a fundamental tool 
of communication and bidirectional dialogue with the constituency. Often, the idea of 
constituency was delimited by the national borders, sometimes it went beyond them. We shall 
call these parliamentarians ‘MEPs 2.0’.
7 
Table 1. Three categories of MEPs 
Type of MEPs  Features  Relative weight 
No website  Absence of personal web page  26.8% (113) 
e-MEPs Basic/Unsophisticated  website 
Low/Mid-interactivity 
Low/Mid-informative level 
Infrequent update 
46.7% (197) 
MEPs 2.0  Sophisticated website 
Mid-/High interactivity 
Mid-/High informative level 
Frequent update 
26.5% (112) 
 
3.1  A general picture: Cross-country and cross-party variance 
Figure 1 summarises the distribution of MEP personal web pages across the 25 member states 
on the basis of our sample. On average, almost three-fourths of the MEPs (73% of the total) had 
some sort of Internet-based platform. However, cross-country variance seems very relevant. 
Four national cohorts emerge as the most wired; all of the Danish, Finnish,
8 Hungarian and 
Slovenian MEPs included in our analysis (29 units) have indeed some sort of ‘web tool’. The 
highest percentage of MEPs 2.0 can be found among the Danes (80%), Austrians (43%) and 
Maltese (40%), while three delegations (Latvia, Estonia and Cyprus) do not include a single 
MEP 2.0. 
It seems quite difficult to identify consistent macro-territorial dimensions. What emerges is that 
MEPs from Mediterranean countries lagged a little behind others. First, none of the 
Mediterranean delegations was ranked among the ten highest scoring delegations.
9 Second, 
three Mediterranean countries, Portugal, Cyprus and Spain, presented the lowest number of 
MEP personal web pages (cfr. Jankowski, Foot, Kluver & Schneider, 2005). The case of Spain 
is striking: on average, only one out of four MEPs had an individual web page! 
                                                      
6 E-MEPs are characterised by basic (0) and not updated (0) web pages, with mid- or low informative (1 
or 2) and interactive level (1 or 2). 
7 MEPs 2.0 are characterised by sophisticated (1) and updated (1) web pages, with mid- or high 
informative (2 or 3) and interactive level (2 or 3). 
8 According to Carlson & Strandberg (2005) the percentage of MEP personal websites in Finland was 
28% in 1996 and 54% in 2004. 
9 The Maltese cohort, whose relative weight in terms of MEPs is negligible, scored the highest rate (11
th) 
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Figure 1. Diffusion of MEP personal websites in each national delegation in the 6
th EP 
 
Source: Own calculations. 
A high level of variance also emerged when examining cross-party differences (see Figure 2). 
Overall, what clearly emerged is the gap between mainstream parties and radical or Eurosceptic 
ones. In this respect, the Greens dominated as the most wired group (with 89% of MEPs having 
a personal web page), followed by the Liberals (85%), EPP-ED (75%) and PES (71%), while 
MEPs affiliated with radical (EUL-NGL) or Eurosceptic (IND-DEM) parties had a website rate 
of 50% and 55%, respectively. A similar gap existed with non-affiliated MEPs, with only 64% 
of the sample having a personal web page. If we look at the qualitative features of the websites, 
the picture is slightly different. The Greens and Liberals not only presented the highest 
percentage of websites; but also the most relevant presence of sophisticated ones (54% and 
40%, respectively). What is interesting is that non-mainstream parties UEN and EUL-NGL 
performed relatively well, at 38% and 30%, respectively, while the two major parties presented 
a very limited number of MEPs 2.0, at 25% (PES) and 19% (EPP-ED), respectively. 
 
Figure 2. Cross-party distribution of MEP typologies in the 6
th EP 
 
Source: Own calculations. 6 | STEFANO BRAGHIROLI 
 
3.2 Socio-demographic  factors 
Looking at the socio-demographic factors is highly revealing (see Appendix 2, Table A2.1). 
Age emerges as the most relevant explanatory factor. Older MEPs are less likely to have a 
personal web page and present, on average, less informative and interactive sites, which are 
frequently not updated. The most striking differences are found in the level of interactivity. 
While among the youngest group (30-39 years) 55% of the websites present highly interactive 
features, among the oldest group (over 70 years) this percentage falls to 17%. This evidence 
emerges as an indicator of very different communication styles, with younger MEPs keener to 
establish a bidirectional dialogue with their constituencies. When it comes to the sophistication 
of the ‘web tool’ adopted, the same trend emerges. While among the youngest parliamentarians 
the percentage of MEPs 2.0 was 49%, among the oldest the percentage was 17%. Looking at 
MEPs’ visual identity, older MEPs tend to favour European party logos over national ones. 
Gender also has important implications. Interestingly, female MEPs appeared more likely to 
have a personal website than their male colleagues (82% vs. 69%); and when they had a 
website, it was, on average, more sophisticated and more frequently up to date. In this respect, 
the percentage of MEPs 2.0 among male MEPs was 24%, while it grows to 33% among female 
MEPs. 
Education did not affect significantly most of the features analysed, with the notable exception 
of multilingualism. As MEPs’ level of education increased, the number of bilingual or 
multilingual websites also increased. Among the MEPs with ‘intermediate education’ the 
percentage of bilingual websites was 7% compared to 21% of those parliamentarians with a 
‘postgraduate education’. 
3.3  Country level factors 
Being an MEP from a Mediterranean country seems to have a negative effect on the presence of 
personal web pages (see Appendix 2, Table A2.2). The percentage of non-wired MEPs varied 
between 27% (EP average) to 48%. Interestingly, in terms of visual identity, Mediterranean 
MEPs made wider use of flags, which were more likely to be European. This aspect might well 
suggest more favourable European sentiments among Mediterranean MEPs (and their voters). 
Most MEPs from Spain, Italy, Malta and Portugal did not have to cope with a significant 
Eurosceptic electorate, unlike their colleagues from other member states, such as the United 
Kingdom or Poland.
10 Accordingly, 84% of the flagged ‘Mediterranean websites’ displayed the 
sole European standard, while only 50% of the British and 23% of the Polish presented the same 
feature. In the postcommunist countries symbols seem to matter more both for the MEPs and for 
their constituency. The Central and Eastern European (CEE) member states indeed appear more 
protective of their national identity and tend to express it through more frequent use of national 
symbols, preferring them to European ones. 
MEPs from CEE, Scandinavia or the Baltic countries also tend to have – on average – more 
multilingual websites: 43% of the pages among CEE MEPs were bilingual, almost triple the 
average of our sample (15%). MEPs from smaller member states tended to have, on average, 
more bilingual and multilingual websites than their colleagues from the EU heavyweights (33% 
vs. 12%). It seems that the MEPs from the largest EU member states did not see as particularly 
                                                      
10 For further details on party-based Euroscepticism, see Taggart & Szczerbiak (2008). POLITICIANS ONLINE! MEP COMMUNICATION STRATEGIES IN THE INTERNET ERA | 7 
 
profitable the use of multilingual Internet-based communication.
11 The presence of only one 
bilingual website
12 among the British seems to confirm this argument. 
When it comes to the structural features of the websites, the explanatory potential of country-
level factors tends to decrease. Interestingly, MEPs from CEE were less likely to use interactive 
and sophisticated platforms.  
3.4 Partisan  dimension 
MEPs’ partisan dimension emerged as highly revealing (see Appendix 2, Table A2.3). Looking 
at the representatives’ ‘visual identity’, the variable ‘left/right’ was positively correlated with all 
the features considered. With a shift from ‘left’ to ‘right’ the average number of nationally 
flagged websites and of national party logos increases, that is, the appeal to national identity 
becomes stronger and it seems to reach its peak among nationalistic or Eurosceptic MEPs (from 
UEN and IND-DEM). While among left-leaning MEPs 96% of the flagged websites displayed 
only the European flag, among right-leaning MEPs the percentage was 33%. Similarly, the 
preference for national party logos reflected a lower attachment to the European parliamentary 
group and may also be an indicator of the weak structuration of the latter. The identity 
connotation of national symbols is also confirmed by the fact that both national flags and 
national party logos were less likely to be found among MEPs from mainstream parties than 
among rightist/radical ones (9% vs. 36% when it comes to logos). 
The mainstream larger parties seem to rely more on new technologies than their smaller and less 
mainstream competitors, as reflected by the higher average number of websites, more frequently 
updated and sophisticated. This finding seems in line with parallel American trends.
13 
When it comes to the structural features of MEP websites, as we shifted from ‘left’ to ‘right’ the 
average number of sophisticated websites decreased, along with their informative level, degree 
of interactivity and frequency of updates. In this respect, it seems worth noting that in centre-left 
delegations 54% of the sample emerged as composed of MEPs 2.0, while among centre-right 
delegations the percentage fell to 19%. This result seems to suggest that MEPs affiliated with 
right-wing parties are less interested in the ‘quality’ of Internet-based communication; however, 
this ‘more conservative’ attitude in the use of Internet-based communication does not reduce 
remarkably their chances of having a personal web page. 
3.5 Micro-/macro-electoral factors 
A final set of factors addresses the impact of electoral dynamics on MEP Internet-based 
communication (see Appendix 2, Table A2.4). In terms of micro-level (individual) factors, 
being a first-timer seems to make the difference both in the features displayed by the websites 
and in legislators’ attitudes towards multilinguism. The longer MEPs serve in Parliament, the 
less sophisticated their websites.
14 In this respect, while among first-timers the percentage of 
                                                      
11 For further details see European Commission (2006), “Europeans and their Languages” (PDF). Special 
Eurobarometer 243. Europa (web portal), pp. 141-154. 
http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/ebs/ebs_243_en.pdf. Retrieved on 19 January 2009. 
12 It is noteworthy that the second language is Welsh, considered a minority language. 
13 D’Alessio (2000). 
14 If we control for MEP age, while the intensity of the relationship decreases, the orientation of the 
coefficients (computed for multilinguism and informative level) does not change and the gap seems to 
persist. On the contrary, this operation severely reduces the reliability of tenure as a predictor of site 
sophistication, as the orientation of the correlation seems to vary according to MEP age. 8 | STEFANO BRAGHIROLI 
 
MEPs 2.0 was 29%, among senior MEPs (with five or six mandates) the percentage was 
negligent. 
As for country-level electoral factors, the presence of party-centred electoral systems seemed to 
negatively affect the likelihood of MEPs going online (-10% if compared to candidate-centred 
systems). This seems to confirm a more general perception that systems with open ballots in 
local constituencies tend to favour candidate electoral activism more than central parties.  
3.6 Recent  developments:  A quick look at the 7
th EP 
In this last empirical section we will briefly explore the most recent Internet-based 
communication developments in the current EP.
15 The trend that emerged from the analysis of 
the 6
th EP seems confirmed by the current EP and the diffusion of ‘web tools’ among MEPs has 
become the rule. MEPs without some sort of web page represent a clearly declining minority 
(14%) and are approaching extinction (-13 percentage points in comparison to the 6
th EP). 
On the whole, while in the previous Parliament the impact of the geographical dimension 
seemed relevant, in the current legislature some differences outlined in previous sections tend to 
disappear (see Figure 3). What emerges is a general trend towards greater diffusion of Internet-
based communication. Almost every national delegation has experienced an increase in terms of 
Internet penetration and the number of 100%-wired delegations has increased from four to eight 
(including the Finnish, Hungarian, Maltese, Dutch, Swedish, Cypriot, Danish, and Latvian 
cohorts). Unlike in the preceding Parliament, several Mediterranean delegations emerge as the 
most wired, namely Cyprus and Malta (100%) and Greece and Italy (94%). Among the least 
wired delegations we still find the Portuguese and the Spanish
16 (which, however, experienced 
an increase of 22 percentage points). 
Figure 3. Diffusion of MEP personal websites in each national delegation in the 7
th EP 
 
Source: Own calculations. 
If we look at the distribution of individual web pages across the political groups, we see a 
widespread increase of web pages in all the groups considered (see Figure 4). The most 
impressive growth in terms of Internet penetration seems to have been experienced by the EPP 
group (+15%). The party of the Socialists and Democrats experienced more moderate growth of 
7 percentage points, while the Liberal-Democrats appear somewhat stable (+3%). Needless to 
                                                      
15 The analysis includes only the three major parties: European People’s Party (EPP), the party of the 
Socialists and Democrats (S&D) and the Liberal-Democrats (ALDE). 
16 The Spanish anomaly is mostly due to the structurally low score of the Spanish socialists. POLITICIANS ONLINE! MEP COMMUNICATION STRATEGIES IN THE INTERNET ERA | 9 
 
say, what has been presented in this last section represents only a preliminary look at the most 
recent developments.  
Figure 4. Cross-party diffusion of MEP personal websites in the 7
th EP 
 
Source: Own calculations (EPP: http://www.eppgroup.eu/links/en/members.asp; S&D 
http://www.socialistsanddemocrats.eu/gpes/public/linkhome.htm?section=NET&category=LINK&reques
t_locale=EN; ALDE: http://www.alde.eu/en/about-us/meps/). 
4. Final  considerations 
In the light of our analysis we can conclude that MEPs 2.0 appear to have invested significant 
resources to develop highly interactive platforms of communication. They provide a constant 
and ‘qualitatively high’ flow of information and involve voters and supporters by means of 
interactive e-fora or regular chat rooms. 
In the eyes of the most active MEPs – who seem to represent a growing minority – this can be 
seen as a way to bypass traditional information channels, which are usually weak at the 
European level, and to establish a more direct dialogue with sectors of society more familiar 
with the web (Lusoli, 2005a). In an interview, one Italian MEP declared that “there is a 
structural limit which day after day puts in danger and weakens our inclusive efforts. To put it 
simply, 90% of our voters have no idea of our role in Brussels. They do not know what we do 
and what we deal with”.
17 Another lamented that “on the whole, there is no connection at all. 
For most of the voters Europe doesn’t matter that much; they barely realise what the European 
elections are. For this reason, it is also difficult to establish such a connection. Nobody invites 
us to discuss and to present Europe at home”.
18 For MEPs 2.0 the use of sophisticated and 
interactive tools may represent a practical way to escape this vicious circle and to establish and 
maintain a preferential (and relatively low-cost) link with their constituency. 
Our figures show that while almost three-fourths of MEPs had some sort of personal ‘web tools’ 
in the past EP, when it comes to more qualitative aspects the picture blurs. On the one hand, we 
found a plurality of e-MEPs (47%) who consider Internet-based platforms as a sort of secondary 
tool; on the other hand, a minority of MEPs 2.0 (27%) clearly gives priority to Internet-based 
communication. The trend seems to have evolved towards higher Internet penetration in the 
current EP. 
                                                      
17 Author’s interview of an Italian MEP, 28 May 2008. 
18 Author’s interview of an Italian MEP, 27 May 2008. 10 | STEFANO BRAGHIROLI 
 
After testing a wide range of indicators, we observed that MEP attitudes towards Internet-based 
communication are influenced by a number of factors. Most of them seem personal (such as 
age, gender, education, parliamentary tenure or previous profession); however, macro- and 
country-level factors also proved to have a relevant impact. Both the communication styles and 
nature of vertical communication between elites and voters are influenced by MEPs’ national 
settings. Both of the considered territorial dimensions (North-South and East-West) were found 
to play a significant role. Testing the relevance of specific territorial dimensions, we found, for 
instance, that MEPs from southern European or Mediterranean countries tend, on average, to 
rely less on Internet-based communication, whereas those from CEE countries seem to embrace 
a more traditional vision of e-politics (preponderance of e-MEPs), given the fact that their 
websites emerge as relatively less interactive and sophisticated. We believe that analysing these 
differences can shed light on features of vertical communication between elites and voters. This 
seems in line with what has been suggested by other previous studies. According to one study, 
“in countries, such as Portugal, the Web played a very minor role in the campaign; here, 
political campaigns are still undertaken with the tried and true tools employed in media 
strategies The lines of division regarding incorporation of the Web into political campaigns 
seem oriented along the European north-south rather than the west-east axis”.
19 
One of the most intriguing results of our analysis is the detection of a positive relationship 
between the existence of candidate-centred electoral systems and the presence of MEP 
individual websites. In this context, it seems more profitable for MEPs to have a personal 
website, as it tends to facilitate the maximisation of their electoral efforts. On the other hand, it 
seems no coincidence that most of the major parties in the systems characterised by greater 
party centrality tend to favour the collective portals of the national delegations at the expense of 
MEP individual websites. To summarise, we discovered that the ‘quality’ of the message is 
influenced not only by the messenger’s individual characteristics, but also by his/her 
background and by the features of the environment in which he/she operates and competes to 
make his/her message heard. 
In the light of these results it might be fruitful for still reluctant MEPs (or euro-candidates) 
operating in countries marked by candidate-centred electoral systems to embrace a more 
proactive attitude towards the Internet, given the relative low cost of becoming e-MEPs or even 
MEPs 2.0. The same investment might prove less profitable for politicians operating in party-
centred environments. 
A second factor which might prove relevant is paying greater attention to the nature and 
expectations of the ‘electorate of reference’ in terms of demand and offer. In this respect, those 
MEPs whose ‘privileged electorate’ is composed by relatively young voters characterised by 
strong Internet penetration and familiarity with e-tools and social networking might find it more 
profitable to develop sophisticated and interactive tools. The same arguments might prove true 
for those parties whose electorate appears more postmaterialist, typically the Greens or the new 
alternative left. Politicians addressing primarily traditional and relatively older electorates might 
find this shift unnecessary, unless they intend to extend their electorate beyond traditional 
borders. These arguments seem to be even more relevant when we look at the most recent 
developments in the current EP, given the constant trend towards greater penetration and quality 
of Internet-based communication. The next step will be increased interaction by MEPs not only 
through their personal web pages, but also through social media, such as Twitter, Facebook or 
YouTube. 
 
                                                      
19 Jankowski, Foot, Kluver & Schneider (2005, p. 171). | 11 
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Appendix 1. Methodological note 
1. The dependent variables: operationalisation and coding 
The first factor registered is the existence of a personal web page. The variable is dichotomous 
and coded as follows: absence (0), presence (1). 
A further distinction concerns the type of site chosen. The variable ‘type of site’ is dichotomous 
and has been coded as follows: basic web pages (0), sophisticated and flexible websites and/or 
highly interactive Internet-based platforms
20 (1). 
The assessment of the content of the websites has been conducted according to standardised and 
systematised criteria. The method of analysis chosen is twofold. On the one hand, we looked at 
the degree of information channelled by the websites; on the other hand, we addressed the way 
the information flow was conveyed. 
The variable ‘Information’ is ordinal and coded as follows: low informative (1), somewhat 
informative (2), very informative (3).
21  
The variable ‘interactivity’ is ordinal and coded as follows: little interaction (1), somewhat 
interactive (2), very interactive (3).
22  
One final variable addressing the informative nature of the websites concerns the updating 
process. The variable ‘update’ is dichotomous and has been coded as follows: dated (0), recently 
updated (1). 
The variable ‘multilingualism’ is ordinal and coded as follows: only national language (1), 
national language and one foreign language (2), national language and two or more foreign 
languages (3). Regional and minority languages were coded as follows: national language and 
minority language (89), national language, minority language, and one or more foreign 
languages (99). 
The variable ‘logo’
23 has therefore an ordinal nature and is coded as follows: European party 
logo (1), both European and national party logos (2), national party logo (3). The category 
‘absence of both logos’ has been assigned code 99 and has been excluded from the analysis. 
The variable ‘flag1’ is dichotomous and it registers the absence (0) or presence of a flag (1). The 
variable ‘flag2’ is ordinal and coded as follows: European flag (1), both European and national 
flags (2), national flag (3). 
 
                                                      
20 Such as the most common social networks (i.e. Facebook or MySpace). 
21 The sites providing only personal information (CV, political career, publications, etc.) were classified 
as “low informative”. Those sites including extensive references to MEP political activity (speeches, 
proposals, articles, press releases, etc.) and sporadic posts and messages to the audience were classified as 
“somewhat informative”. Those providing deep and regular coverage of MEP activity (written 
documents, as above, video clips and audio files) and regular and frequent communication with the 
constituency were classified as “very informative”. 
22 Accordingly, web pages providing only contact details (phone, email address, office address) were 
classified as “little interaction”. Those providing the possibility to post direct comments to the articles 
were classified as “somewhat interactive”. Finally, those websites also containing structured platforms for 
collective discussion (i.e. web fora or chat rooms) and/or links to highly interactive social networks (i.e. 
MySpace or Facebook) were classified as “very interactive”. 
23 This variable addresses the absence or presence of a “European visual dimension”. POLITICIANS ONLINE! MEP COMMUNICATION STRATEGIES IN THE INTERNET ERA | 13 
 
Table A1.1 Presentation of the dependent variables  
Variable  Operationalisation 
Existence of 
personal web page 
Absence (0), presence (1) 
Type of site  Basic web page (0), sophisticated web page (1) 
Information  Low informative (1), somewhat informative (2), very informative (3) 
Interactivity  Little interaction (1), somewhat interactive (2), very interactive (3) 
Update  Dated (0), recently updated (1) 
Multilinguism  National language (1), national language + one foreign language (2), national 
language + two or more foreign languages (3), national language and minority 
language (89), national language, minority language + one or more foreign 
languages (99) 
Logo  European party logo (1), both European and national party logos (2), national 
party logo (3), absence of both logos (99) 
Flag1  absence (0) , presence (1) 
Flag2  European flag (1), both European and national flags (2), national flag (3) 
 
2. Control factors 
While gender is dichotomous, MEP age and education are categorical ordinal and respectively 
range from ‘30-39yrs’ (1) to ‘70-100yrs’ (5) and from ‘elementary school’ (1) to ‘postgraduate 
education’ (4). 
All the country-level variables are dichotomous. The first variable ‘postcommunist country’ 
addresses the existence of an East-West divide. ‘Country size’ addresses different styles of 
communication between smaller member states and EU heavyweights. Two variables are 
introduced in order to capture the effect of regional diversity across the EU: ‘MEPs from 
Mediterranean countries’ and ‘MEPs from Scandinavian or Baltic countries’. 
Two variables addressing MEP partisanship have been created. The former measures the impact 
of MEP partisan affiliation. The left/right divide has been measured on a five-point scale, 
ranging from Left (1) to Right (5), with respect to MEP partisan affiliation in the 6
th EP.
24 The 
second variable, type of party, distinguishes between mainstream parties (1) and so-called 
‘niche/fringe/eurosceptic parties’ (0), irrespective of their left/right orientation.
25 
As for the electoral factors, at the individual level we looked at MEPs’ past political career and 
their parliamentary tenure.
26 The former is a dichotomous variable and is coded as follows: 
party official (1), other (0). Parliamentary tenure ranges from ‘1
st EP mandate’ (1) to ‘6
th EP 
                                                      
24 Respectively, European United Left-Nordic Green Left (EUL-NGL) and European Greens-European 
Free Alliance (EG-EFA) have been classified as left (1), the Party of European Socialists (PES) has been 
classified as centre-left (2), the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE) has been 
classified as centre (3), the European People’s Party-European Democrats (EPP-ED) has been classified 
as centre-right (4), and Union for Europe of the Nations (UEN), Independence/Democracy (IND/DEM), 
and Non-Inscrits (NI) have been classified as right (5). 
25 The European People’s Party-European Democrats (EPP-ED), the Party of European Socialists (PES), 
the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE), and the European Greens-European Free 
Alliance (EG-EFA) have been categorised as mainstream parties (1), while the European United Left-
Nordic Green Left (EUL-NGL), Union for Europe of the Nations (UEN), Independence/Democracy 
(IND/DEM) and Non-Inscrits (NI) have been classified as “niche parties” (0). 
26 Source: CIRCaP archive of parliamentary careers. 14 | STEFANO BRAGHIROLI 
 
mandate’ (6). At the macro-level we categorised member state electoral institutions.
27 The 
variable ‘open lists’ is dichotomous and coded as follows: absence of open lists (0), presence of 
open lists (1); the index ‘party centrality’ ranges from ‘highly candidate-centred’ (0) to ‘highly 
party-centred’ (1). 
Table A1.2 Presentation of the independent variables 
Set of variables  Variable  Operationalisation 
Gender  Male (1), female (2) 
Age  From ‘30-39yrs’ (1) to ‘70-100yrs’ (5) 
Socio-demographic 
Education  From ‘elementary school’ (1) to ‘postgraduate 
education’ (4) 
Postcommunist country  No (0), yes (1) 
Country size  Small (0), big (1) 
Mediterranean  No (0), yes (1) 
Country-level 
Scandinavian-Baltic 
country 
No (0), yes (1) 
Left/right divide  From Left (1) to Right (5)  Partisanship 
Type of party  Mainstream party (1), fringe party (0) 
Past political career  Party official (1), other (0)  Individual electoral 
factors  Parliamentary tenure  From ‘1
st EP mandate’ (1) to ‘6
th EP mandate’ (6) 
Open lists  Absence (0), presence (1)  Macro-level electoral 
factors  Party centrality  From ‘highly candidate-centred’ (0) to ‘highly 
party-centred’ (1) 
 
                                                      
27 EU member states have been classified as follows: Closed lists and nation-wide constituency (EE, DE, 
HU, GR and ES), closed lists and more electoral districts (IT, FR and UK), ordered lists and nation-wide 
constituency (LV, SE, CZ, SK, CY, AT, NL and PT), ordered and more electoral districts (BE and PL), 
preferences and nation-wide constituency (LT, SI, LU, MT, FI and DK), single transferable vote and 
more electoral districts (IE). Member state electoral regulations were retrieved from the EP website. For 
further details see http://www.europarl.europa.eu/parliament/archive/elections2009/en/index_en.html. | 15 
Appendix 2 
Note of caution: In case of high and significant correlation between two independent variables 
included in the model, all the coefficients presented in the study (Spearman’s R) were controlled 
accordingly. In all the cases discussed in the paper the orientation of the original correlation 
did not change, while presenting satisfactory levels of significance, unless explicitly mentioned 
in the text. 
Table A2.1 Socio-demographic factors 
 Gender  Age  Education 
Website  Yes / No  .134** -.140**  -.041 
Logos  -.021 -.108*  -.074 
Flag  -.094 .002  .098 
Visual identity 
Flag (Yes / No)  -.064 .101* -.027 
Multilinguism / Audience  Languages  .048 -.019  .205** 
Type of website  .113* -.094 .020 
Informative level  .093 -.149**  -.012 
Interactivity  .038 -.168**  .018 
Features of the website 
Update  .107* -.181**  .061 
Source: Coefficients in columns are Spear. R. * Correlation is significant at .05 level; ** Correlation is 
significant at .001 level. 
Table A2.2 Country level factors 
  Postcommunist 
country 
Country 
size 
Mediterranean 
country 
Scandinavia 
or Baltic 
country 
Website  Yes / No  .108* -.027  -.271**  .000 
Logos  -.037 -.027  .065  -.162** 
Flag  .351** .006  -.199* .270** 
Visual identity 
Flag (Yes / No)  .078 .058  .118*  -.062 
Multilinguism / 
Audience 
Languages  .363** -.253**  -.092  .196** 
Type of website  -.036 -.127*  -.009 .082 
Informative level  -.032 .009  .055  .010 
Interactivity  -.156** -.031  .022  -.003 
Features 
of the website 
Update  .048 -.130*  -.078  -.016 
Source: Coefficients in columns are Spear. R. * Correlation is significant at .05 level; ** Correlation is 
significant at .001 level. 
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Table A2.3 Partisan dimension 
 Left-right  divide  Type of party 
(mainstream / niche) 
Website  Yes / No  -.007 .142** 
Logos  .227** -.229** 
Flag  .371** -.216* 
Visual identity 
Flag (Yes / No)  .143** -.024 
Multilinguism / Audience  Languages  .001 .026 
Type of website  -.125* .051 
Informative level  -.112* .026 
Interactivity  -.134** .036 
Features of the website 
Update  -.229** .100* 
Source: Coefficients in columns are Spear. R. * Correlation is significant at .05 level; ** Correlation is 
significant at .001 level. 
Table A2.4 Individual and country-level electoral factors 
  Previous career  Tenure  Open lists  Electoral 
institutions 
Website  Yes / No  -.017 .026  .085*  -.107** 
Multilinguism / 
Audience 
Languages  -.098* -.245**  .099*  .118* 
Type of website  -.029 -.120*  .004  .020 
Informative level  .048 -.108*  .003  .046 
Interactivity  -.049 -.008  .055  -.020 
Features 
of the website 
Update  -.100* -.012  .044  .083 
Source: Coefficients in columns are Spear. R. * Correlation is significant at .05 level; ** Correlation is 
significant at .001 level. 
 About EPIN 
 
EPIN is a network of European think tanks and policy institutes with members in almost 
every member state and candidate country of the European Union. It was established in 2002 
during the constitutional Convention on the Future of Europe. Then, its principal role was to 
follow the works of the Convention. More than 30 conferences in member states and 
candidate countries were organised in the following year.  
With the conclusion of the Convention, CEPS and other participating institutes decided to 
keep the network in operation. EPIN has continued to follow the constitutional process in all 
its phases: (1) the intergovernmental conference of 2003-2004; (2) the ratification process of 
the Constitutional Treaty; (3) the period of reflection; and (4) the intergovernmental 
conference of 2007. Currently, EPIN follows (5) the ratification process of the Lisbon Treaty 
and – should the treaty enter into force – (6) the implementation of the Treaty. 
Since 2005, an EPIN Steering Committee takes the most important decisions. Currently there 
are six member institutes: CEPS, DIIS (Denmark), ELCANO (Spain), HIIA (Hungary), Notre 
Europe (France) and SIEPS (Sweden). 
Status quo 
Currently there are 30 EPIN members from 26 countries, also from countries outside of the 
EU. The 'hard core' work of the network is based on the cooperation of about 10 most active 
institutes. The member institutes are quite diverse in size and structure, but are all 
characterised by political independence and the absence of any predetermined point of view 
or political affiliation. 
EPIN organises two major conferences in Brussels per year; as well as ad hoc conferences or 
other activities in member states. The network publishes Working Paper Series and other 
papers, which primarily focus on institutional reform of the Union. The network follows 
preparations for the European elections, the EU’s communication policy, and the political 
dynamics after enlargement, as well as EU foreign policy and justice and home affairs. 
Achievements 
EPIN is a network that offers its member institutes the opportunity to contribute to the 
'European added-value' for researchers, decision-makers and citizens. The network provides a 
unique platform for researchers and policy analysts to establish personal links, exchange 
knowledge and collaborate on EU-related issues. Members bring their national perspectives to 
bear on the issues tackled and through collaboration they contribute to establish a 'European 
added-value' (e.g. on EU communication, flexible integration). By doing so they strengthen a 
common European dimension in the national debates on Europe. 
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